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I. Introduction
In many countries state governments face soft budget constraints. Budget constraints are soft when state governments can expect to be bailed out by the federal government in times of financial crisis (Kornai 1979 , 1986 , 1998 , Kornai, Maskin and Roland 2003 . State government officials have a bailout expectation because the federal government is unable to credibly commit ex ante to a no-bailout strategy (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995). Consequently, state governments facing soft budget constraints have a weak incentive to conduct fiscally responsible policies. 3 Although the federal government could potentially bail any state government, budget constraints may not be equally soft across states. A simple political economy model predicts that politically influential states--states with more bargaining power--will take advantage of their influence over the federal government by running higher deficits, and not pursuing fiscally responsible policies. Because of their superior bargaining power, they expect to receive bailouts from the federal government in times of financial crises. When the degree of states' bailout expectations is plausibly exogenous, an empirical model can identify the effect of soft budget constraints on fiscal outcomes.
In Germany some states are politically more influential than others because states' voting weights differ in the upper chamber of the German parliament, the Bundesrat. Less populous German states are overrepresented relative to their population size in the Bundesrat; similarly, as less populous states in the U.S. are overrepresented in the U.S. Senate. Overrepresented states have softer budget constraints and thus more bargaining power to obtain bailouts compared to states that are underrepresented in the Bundesrat. The malapportionment in the Bundesrat 2 provides exogenous variation in bailout expectations and thus the softness of states' budget constraints. 4 In this paper we test whether states with softer budget constraints have weaker fiscal incentives, measured as higher deficits and debts. We also test whether these states receive more routine bailout funds, where we refer to bailouts as both discretionary grants from the federal government and grants that arise from the institutionalized redistribution of funds across states.
Both of these institutionalized bailouts grants are in part a function of fiscal condition of states. 5 We probe further into the consequences of soft budget constraints and examine whether they lead to less efficient state spending and whether softer constraints make state governments more receptive to rent seeking by special interests groups, measured as spending benefitting these groups. To estimate these effects we exploit the exogenous variation in state political power in Germany over time, and use an estimation strategy that holds state attributes, which may be correlated with soft budget constraints, constant.
Related to our study is the work on fiscal intergovernmental relations, which focuses on the federal government's problem with credibly committing ex ante to a no-bailout strategy, and the subsequent incentive effects for lower levels of government (Rodden 2002 (Rodden , 2003 (Rodden , 2006a Wildasin 1997) . 6 These studies focus on identifying instances of soft budget constraints and describe how country-specific institutional structures give rise to soft budget constraints. Less 3 emphasis is placed on exploiting variations in the softness of the budget constraint and testing predictions about fiscal policies when states face bailout guarantees (Rodden 2002 (Rodden , 2003 (Rodden , 2006a Wildasin 1997 ). 7 We also investigate the consequences of other differences in states' bargaining power arising from the political similarity between the federal government and the state governments (Grossman 1994 ). In a model where the federal government, in order to pass legislation, has to purchase the votes of the majority of states, a state with the same political makeup as the federal government has a lower supply price of votes, and a state with the opposite political makeup has a higher supply price. But the federal government does not have to purchase votes from the latter, who have the highest supply price, because passage of legislation requires not unanimity, but only a majority of votes. Thus, states with the median supply price receive the highest price.
These states tend to be both those governed by parties represented in the federal government's governing coalition, as well those not in the governing coalition. Thus, this bargaining model predicts the largest redistribution to states that have a median supply price of votes (Denzau and Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992 ).
We analyze annual data by state from 1970 to 2004 and find that states with softer budget constraints have higher deficits and debts, resulting from higher expenditures. Further, these states receive more bailouts funds from other states and from the federal government. We also find that states with softer budget constraints tend to spend a larger share of funds on programs benefitting special interests and also spend their funds less efficiently.
7 Similar as in this study, Rodden (2006a) 
II.B. Tax Revenues
The German governing system has three levels: local, state and federal. The local governments administer the provision of utility services, and manage local infrastructure and welfare benefits.
At the state level, governments provide primary, secondary, and university education, manage cultural affairs, policing services, and the administration of justice. The federal government provides national defense, handles international affairs, unemployment benefits, and social security.
The German 'fiscal constitution' is two-tiered. 
II.C. Intergovernmental Bailout Transfers
Redistribution from the federal level to the state level and across states is motivated by article 107 of the German Constitution which mandates "a reasonable equalization of the disparate financial capacities of the Länder." 12 The current federal Financial Equalization Law implements the constitutional mandate and codifies conditions for all transfers. According to the Financial Equalization Law, the intergovernmental transfer system aims at equalizing fiscal revenues per capita across states through a redistribution of state tax revenues and transfers of federal funds.
The structure of redistribution has not changed in any essential way since a major federal public finance reform in 1969. 13 Thus, transfers of resources are institutionalized.
Redistribution through the intergovernmental equalization system, by law, depends on each state's per capita tax revenue relative to all other states. Formula-based intergovernmental transfers are directly determined by the states' fiscal performance. Additional funds from the 12 From the official translation of the German Constituion. The Länder are the German states. 13 For a historical background on the German Fiscal Equalization Law see Renzsch (1986 In addition to the aforementioned horizontal redistribution across states, which leads to a redistribution from stronger to weaker states, there is a vertical redistribution of taxpayer funds from the federal government to states (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). Some of these vertical transfers are formula-based and are designed to close 90% of the remaining gap in the average 10 fiscal capacity per capita across states after the horizontal transfers described in the previous paragraph have taken place.
Vertical transfers are also available to assist fiscally weak states in mitigating the consequences of some special burdens at the state level. For example, there are vertical transfers to the five eastern states of Germany and the city state of Berlin, which were integrated into the transfer system in 1995 after the German reunification in 1990. The official intention of these transfers is the alleviation of the consequences of the German separation. 
III. Model the Effect of Malapportionment on Soft Budget Constraints
In a bargaining game, small states are willing to sell their votes at a lower price than larger states, because at a given price their per capita benefit is larger than the per capita benefit to larger The utility costs of higher deficits also depend on the degree of overrepresentation of the state in the Bundesrat ( ) Ω . The more a state is overrepresented, the smaller are the costs from deficits, since transfers are more readily available due to a superior bargaining position. Thus, a state government faces the following maximization problem:
with the following first order condition:
which implies that -assuming the government's utility is concave in deficits, and the utility cost is convex in deficit, or the effect of a marginal increase in deficit on the utility cost function is constant -the more a state is overrepresented, i.e. the larger ( ) Ω , the larger is the optimal deficit.
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This simple model allows us to formulate several hypotheses. First, the model predicts that overrepresented states will run higher deficits. Overrepresented states have an incentive to create a larger gap between expenditures and tax revenues which can be filled, due to their voting power, through transfers from underrepresented states and the federal government.
Second, using a similar logic, we predict that overrepresented states have higher debt per capita.
Because of their superior bargaining power in the Bundesrat, overrepresented states are more likely to receive financial support in cases of indebtedness. Therefore, debt comes at a lower price for overrepresented states, giving them an incentive to have higher debt. A corollary of the deficit and debt hypotheses is overrepresented states will be more successful in seeking bailout funds.
We explore several additional hypotheses. We test whether the increases in deficits that are associated with soft budget constraints are due to increases in spending. We separate total state spending into spending on public goods and private goods, and test whether spending on selected state-provided public and private goods increases with the softness of a state's budget constraint. We test whether governments of overrepresented states spend a larger share of their funds on spending categories that have less public good character and rather serve special interests. This test is motivated by the fact that every increase in bailout funds provides the state government with additional room for discretionary maneuver. With additional horizontal and vertical funds received, the costs of catering to organized special interests decreases, which may result in a shift in the mix of private and public goods provided by the state. Finally, we test whether overrepresented states provide public goods less efficiently than underrepresented states.
IV. Econometric Specification and Data
We The vector it X includes tax revenue per capita. We include the sum of state and local tax revenues as a proxy of the fiscal revenue measure because both state and local revenues are considered in the official calculation of routine bailouts. We also include total state population because the incentive to run a deficit is lower when the state is large. This is because the larger the state, the greater the incentive to internalize the cost of a bailout (Rodden 2006a ). Further, we include population density and the unemployment rate. While the state dummies control for these variables to the extent that they are constant over time, by including these variables explicitly we also control for changes in unemployment, and state population size and density over time.
To test whether overrepresented states receive higher routine bailouts and have higher debt, we substitute various measures for institutionalized bailouts and debt for deficits in equation (3). Table A1 in the appendix provides means and standard deviations of all data used in this paper. Table A1 also includes variable definitions and sources of data.
21 König and Bräuninger (1997) refer to these states as A-states and B-states. 22 An example of the left out category is if a state is governed by the CDU and SPD parties and when the federal government is comprised of the CDU while the SPD is in the opposition at the federal level. 23 Often, the government does not change at the end or the beginning of the year. In these cases we define these variables to equal one when the government formed in the first half of that year. Otherwise we code the election outcomes as effective in the following year. The results reported in Table 2 show that the number of votes per capita in the Bundesrat has the predicted effect on deficits per capita. The more a state is overrepresented the larger is its total deficit. The point estimates on Bundesrat votes is statistically significant at the one percent level. For example, the point estimate in Table 2 , column 4 indicates that one extra vote per capita increases the deficit by €1.8 per capita, which is 0.3 percent of the mean of the total deficit. In the regressions the variable "Votes Per Capita" is measured as number of votes per million population multiplied by a factor of 1,000. Thus, for a state with a population of five million and five seats in the upper chamber, which is close to the seat average, an additional vote in the Bundesrat translates into an increase in the "Votes Per Capita" measure by 200. 25 Accordingly, the point estimate on "votes per capita" in column 4 of 1.8 predicts that in a state of five million, having one extra seat in the Bundesrat leads to a €360 higher per capita deficit.
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V. Results
As mentioned in the introduction, we hypothesized that votes of states in the opposition, that have an even higher opportunity cost of voting for the federal government, typically do not have to be bought in order to obtain a majority in the Bundesrat. Similarly, the federal government also does not have to purchase the votes of states that have the same party composition as that of the federal government, since these state governments are likely to vote for the federal government's position in any case. Table 2 shows that the point estimates on "Government coalition state" and "Government opposition state" are negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. These results suggest that states where the state government is only partially made up by parties that govern at the federal level, i.e. the states in the reference group, have higher deficits than states with governments that are either perfectly similar or perfectly dissimilar to the federal government. Thus, states with mixed governments, i.e.
governments whose votes are cheaper than votes of governments that are entirely composed of opposition parties at the federal level, have the highest deficits. One explanation for this finding is that states with mixed governments have the strongest expectation that they will be bailed out by the federal government in a financial crises.
As expected, tax revenue, our measure of fiscal capacity as defined by German law, has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the one percent level in all specifications of are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the denser a state's population, the lower its deficits. The remaining controls--unemployment and the interaction between votes per capita and eastern states--are not statistically significant.
Next we examine the effect of overrepresentation on debt. Table 3 shows the results. In all specifications more votes in the Bundesrat lead to higher debt. With a point estimate of 5.2 (Table 3 , column 4), using the previous example, one extra vote in the Bundesrat for a state with five million people implies a higher debt of about €1,040 per capita. These results lend further support to the hypothesis that the softer the budget constraint, the less sound the fiscal policy.
The measures on bargaining strength based on the party composition of government are statistically significant and have the predicted negative signs in Table 3 , columns 2 and 3, but are not statistically significant in columns 4 and 5.
Next we examine the effect of soft budget constraints on routine bailouts. In Tables 4A,   4B , and 4C we test for the determinants of the transfer components separately. 26 The three components are: indirect horizontal transfers due to the VAT redistribution according to population (Table 4A) , direct horizontal transfers between the states which depend on the fiscal performance of the state (Table 4B) , and vertical transfers which also depend on fiscal performance and for which the federal government has the largest discretion as to how to allocate these transfers (Table 4C ). The number of votes per capita in the Bundesrat in all three tables is statistically significant at the one percent level, except for one specification in the VAT transfer regression (Table 4A) , which is statistically significant at the ten percent level. Votes per capita have the largest marginal impact in regressions that have as their dependent variable routine bailouts that are distributed with the largest discretion. The associated point estimates 26 When we combine all transfers and use this measure as the dependent variable we find very similar results as those reported when we run separate regressions for each of the three components of overall transfers. range from 0.29 for direct horizontal transfers (Table 4B ) to 1.15 for federal transfers (Table 4C) .
Following up on the example above, for a state with a population of five million, one extra vote translates into an €114 increase in value added tax redistribution (Table 4A , column 4), a €58 increase in horizontal transfers (Table 4B , column 4), and a €230 increase in vertical transfers (Table 4C , column 4).
The finding that of all transfers, transfers from federal to states governments have the largest point estimate of the three types of transfers can be explained with the discretionary nature of these transfers. Federal transfers are to a small part formula-based and largely conditional on the presence of 'special burdens.' In 2004, twenty percent of these transfers were based on the fiscal strength of the recipient states, and the remainder was provided on a more discretionary basis, i.e. on whether a state faced an "excessive" fiscal burden.
We also find that the estimated elasticities for the vote per capita variable are the highest for the vertical transfers. 27 Further, the beta coefficients also suggest that transfers are more responsive to changes in the votes per capita variable with beta coefficients increasing as the discretionary element of the transfers increases. Whereas a one standard deviation change in votes per capita leads to a 1.33 standard deviations change in VAT (Table 4A) , and a 1.74 standard deviations change in horizontal transfers (Table 4B) , a one standard deviation change in votes per capita induces a 4.13 standard deviations change in federal transfers (Table 4C) . 28 We also find that states' bargaining power, based on the political make-up of the state government as opposed federal government matters for bailouts ( Tables 4): states that are only 27 The level of year-to-year discretion for the transfers based on special burdens is reduced by the fact that these transfers are mostly approved for several years in advance. 28 The elasticities show a similar picture. A one percent change in the votes per capita variable induces a 7 percent change in horizontal transfers and a 9.8 percent change in vertical transfers. Maybe surprisingly, the elasticity for VAT transfers is with 8.56 percent higher than that for horizontal transfers. To put these results further into perspective, the corresponding elasticity for the effect of votes per capita on the total deficit per capita is 4.7.
partially comprised of parties which are members of the federal government receive more funds at each stage of the intergovernmental transfer system. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these governments can extract a higher supply price for their votes in the German Bundesrat.
While we find that overrepresented states run higher deficits (Table 2) , the results do not allow for conclusions whether these findings are driven by lower taxes or more spending, and, if it is more spending, which spending categories contribute to the increase in total spending. But given that the German institutional structure does not allow states to set their own tax rates, and that states only have discretion over the spending side of the budget, deficits are predicted to be due to additional expenditures, no lower tax revenues.
For the question of which expenditures are most sensitive to soft budget constraints, we focus on seven spending categories, which we can plausibly divide into public good spending and private good spending. As public goods, we consider spending on political administration (approximately sixty-five percent of which are wages for state government employees), education, police, and culture. As private goods, those most likely to benefit special interests, we consider spending on agriculture, regional aids, and state-run enterprises.
We estimate the following regression for each of the seven spending categories:
where spending measures either total state government spending per capita or spending for each of the spending categories. As in the previous regressions, the variable "votespercapita" measures the votes in the upper chamber divided by state population. We include per capita income among the variables in the it X vector.
The results in Table 5 show that our measure for the softness of budget constraints, votes per capita, is positively correlated with overall spending. The point estimates on overall spending are statistically significant, suggesting that the increase in deficits and debt found in previous tables, is driven by an increase in spending. Though not reported in the tables, we also estimated this specification using per capita state tax revenues as the dependent variable and found that the point estimates on "votespercapita" are positive and not statistically significant. Given that German states have limited taxing authority and that state tax revenues are small, the finding that revenues are uncorrelated with overrepresentation in the Bundesrat is not surprising. Table 5 shows that the point estimates on per capita spending are positive for six spending categories. 29 Five of these estimates are statistically significant. Votes per capita has the largest marginal effect on regional aid and state enterprises, both of which are largely private goods. We find the next largest marginal effect for government administration. The marginal effect of spending on police and culture is one third or less the size of the effect of spending on political administration. Education expenditures and agricultural expenditures are not affected by soft budget constraints and the size of the coefficient on agriculture is very small and negative.
These findings show that, with the exception of agriculture, the largest spending increases occur for private goods, followed by spending on government administration. The closer the good is to public goods, like police and education, the lower the marginal effects of votes per capita.
State governments face pressure from interest groups to increase spending and alter regulations to their benefit. A state government with a soft budget constraint--and thus more resources--may be more likely to placate rent seeking interest groups. Thus, we next investigate whether overrepresented states spend a smaller portion of their budgets on public goods.
The results in Table 6 are based on a similar specification to those in Table 5 , but the dependent variable is public goods spending and private goods spending as a share of the state 22 budget. The first four columns in Table 6 report results for the goods we consider to be closer to public goods. We find that for all public goods categories the expectation of a bailout has a negative effect on the share of public goods spending. Among these categories the point estimates for relative spending on education, police, and culture are statistically significant.
The last three columns of Table 6 contain the categories that we considered private goods and measures of favors to special interests. Here, overrepresentation has a positive effect on relative spending and the point estimates are statistically significant for agriculture and regional aids. Overrepresented states devote a larger proportion of their budgets on these latter categories.
The coefficient for state enterprises is positive but overrepresentation has no statistically significant effect on the proportion of funds spent on state enterprises. Together, Tables 5 and 6 suggest that overrepresentation leads to higher expenditures in almost all spending categories, but the amount spent, as a share of the total budget, decreases for public goods and increases for private goods. Table 7 examines the effect of soft budget constraints on government efficiency. We measure efficiency by dividing spending by the relevant input. We estimate a similar specification as in Table 4 , but use as the dependent variables police spending per crime, hospital spending per patient and primary and secondary education expenditures per student. 30 We selected these three measures based on availability of a plausible input measure for a spending category. Table 7 shows that the point estimates on votes per capita are positive and statistically significant with police spending and hospital spending as the dependent variable. The point estimate in the education expenditures regression is also positive, but statistically insignificant.
Assuming services stemming from three expenditure categories are comparable across states, the results in Table 7 suggest that states with soft budget constraints spend their funds less efficiently than other states. States with soft budget constraints spend more money per case, i.e. crime committed and patients treated, for roughly equivalent services.
VI. Conclusion
Theoretically, soft budget constraints give states an incentive to conduct unsustainable fiscal policies. However, bailout expectations cannot be directly observed. We use a plausibly Institutionalized bailouts, which, according to many pages of German laws and regulations are determined by formula, are sensitive to the political power of state governments.
States that are overrepresented and states that have superior bargaining power due to the constellation of party representation in the federal vs. state government receive the most funds in all three types of institutionalized bailouts. The political bargaining power is most effective for those bailout funds that have the highest discretionary element.
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Overrepresentation and the associated bailout expectation also impact how state government funds are spent. The larger the expectation of a bailout, the higher the amount spent in a number of spending categories, and special interests are most likely to benefit from this additional spending. We also find that bailout expectations lead to less efficient state government service provision. 
